Resolving Unresolved Relationship problems – the case of Cross Border Insolvency and Pending Arbitrations by Chuah, J. C. T.
Chuah, J. C. T. (2011). Resolving Unresolved Relationship problems – the case of Cross Border 
Insolvency and Pending Arbitrations. European Company and Financial Law, 8(4), pp. 423-444. 
doi: 10.1515/ECFR.2011.423 
City Research Online
Original citation: Chuah, J. C. T. (2011). Resolving Unresolved Relationship problems – the case 
of Cross Border Insolvency and Pending Arbitrations. European Company and Financial Law, 8(4), 
pp. 423-444. doi: 10.1515/ECFR.2011.423 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/6679/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Resolving Unresolved Relationship Problems – the Case
of Cross Border Insolvency and Pending Arbitrations
by
Jason Chuah*
The relationship between arbitration and insolvency in a cross border context is fraught with
difficulties which can blight transnational insolvency practice. This article is concerned with
the judicial constructs applied (in the EU, civil law and common law traditions) to resolve the
conflict between a pending arbitration in one country and forthcoming insolvency proceed-
ings in another. Should the arbitration be allowed to continue andwhat law should be used to
determine the issue? In the EU, it might be said that the question is largely determined by the
EU Insolvency Regulation. A comparative law and teleological discussion would highlight
the different imperatives adopted in the different judicial approaches to the problem.
The debate has sometimes been reduced to a pro or anti arbitration dispute. This article is less
concerned with that direct confrontation. Instead, it is interested in the debate about the
public interest which is claimed to bemaintainedwhen arbitration is allowed or disallowed to
proceed in the light of impending insolvency. It thus draws on case examples from different
jurisdictions to examine the perceived judicial role to protect the public interest by controlling
arbitrations in this context.
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I. Introduction
The relationship between arbitration and insolvency in a cross border context
is fraught with difficulties which can blight transnational insolvency practice.
* Professor of Commercial and Maritime Law and Head of Academic Law, City Law
School, City University London, United Kingdom.
One difficulty might be the enforceability of an arbitration agreement made
prior to the insolvency of one of the parties. A secondmight be whether and to
what extent the insolvency matters or bankruptcy issues could be made the
subject of the arbitration. A third could be whether a stay of the arbitral
proceedings could be given when insolvency proceedings have commenced.
A fourth relates to the enforceability or challenge of an arbitral award on
substance pending or after insolvency. A fifth might be the role of the judiciary
in controlling insolvency proceedings against the background of arbitral pro-
ceedings having been commenced. The list of different contextual settings and
issues can go on1. In this article, the discussion takes on some of these issues in
a cross border context. In particular, we examine what should happen to
arbitration proceedings pending in one EU Member State whilst insolvency
proceedings relating to one of the parties have commenced in anotherMember
State. Civil and common law traditions and practice not influenced by EU law
will serve as a comparative backdrop. The debate has sometimes been reduced
to a pro or anti arbitration dispute. This article is less concerned with that
direct confrontation; instead, the interest is in the role of public interest when
deciding to allow or disallow a pending arbitration to proceed in the light of
forthcoming insolvency action.
The problem arose before the English court recently. In Jozef Syska (acting as
administrator for Elektrim SA (in bankruptcy)) v Vivendi Universal SA2,
Elektrim, a company established in Poland, had entered into a number of
investment contracts with two Vivendi companies in 2001. The two Vivendi
companies were incorporated in France. The investment agreement was ex-
pressed to be governed by Polish law but contained an arbitration agreement
referring to arbitration in England before the London Court of International
1 There is a good amount of literature, albeit in varying depths, on the relationship between
arbitration and insolvency; see, for example, Gary B. Born, International Commercial
Arbitration 809-17 (2009); Jean-Francois Poudret & Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law
of International Arbitration 305-09 (2007); Julian D.M. Lew et al., Comparative Interna-
tional Arbitration 206-08 (2003); Philippe Fouchard et al., Emmanuel Gaillard & John
Savage (eds.), On International Arbitration 345, 355-56 (1999); Nigel Blackaby et al.,
Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, M 2.128-.132 (5th ed. 2009);
W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 68-69 (3d
ed. 2000).
2 [2009] EWCA Civ 677 (before the English Court of Appeal) on appeal from the Com-
mercial Court’s decision in [2008] EWHC 2155 (Comm). Hereafter referred to as “Elek-
trim”. This case generated some discussion in Baizeau,Compétence de l’arbitre et faillite
á la lumière des arrêts anglais et suisse dans l’affaire Vivendi/Elektrim [Arbitrator’s
Jurisdiction And Insolvency in the light of the English and Swiss Decisions in the Vivendi
v Elektrim Case], 3 Gazette Du Palais (Spécial Arbitrage) 5 N.2 (2009) and Markat,
“Arbitrating in the Financial Crisis: Insolvency and Public Policy versus Arbitration
and Party Autonomy – Which Law Governs? (2009) 2(2) Contemp. Asia Arb. J. 217.
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Arbitration (LCIA). The arbitration agreement was expressed to be governed
by English law. Following a dispute, Vivendi instituted arbitration proceed-
ings in London against Elektrim for the sum of 51.9 billion in August 2003. A
hearing date was fixed by the arbitrators for 15–19 October 2007.
In August 2007, Elektrim petitioned for bankruptcy in Poland3 and was de-
clared so under Polish law on 21 August 2007. At the arbitration hearing in
October 2007, Elektrim argued that the arbitration agreement was annulled
following its bankruptcy. The arbitral tribunal ruled by amajority of 2-1 that it
had jurisdiction under the arbitration agreement and proceeded to find Elek-
trim liable for breach of the investment agreement. An awardwasmade against
Elektrim.
Elektrim then issued proceedings before the English court asking for the
award to be set aside on the basis that there was failure or substantive juris-
diction4. Much depended on whether the Polish law5 which provided that
“any arbitration clause concluded by the bankrupt shall lose its legal effect
as at the date bankruptcy is declared and any pending arbitration proceedings
shall be discontinued” was applicable. It was common ground that if the
Polish law applied, the arbitration process would be invalid.
The answer to this somewhat complicated question lies in how two articles in
the European InsolvencyRegulation6 (EIR) should be interpreted and applied.
Article 4.2(e) of the EIR requires that the effect of the opening of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings on ‘current contracts’ be determined in accordance with
the law of the bankruptcy (the lex concursus). Elektrim argued that the arbi-
tration agreement was a ‘current contract’ and, as such, applying Polish law as
the lex concursus, the arbitration should come to an end because under Polish
law the arbitration agreement was now void.On the other hand, Vivendi relied
3 Before the Warsaw District Court. Initially, the petition was on the basis that Elektrim
was to remain a debtor in possession with Mr Syska acting as court supervisor, the War-
sawDistrict Court saw it fit to revoke Elektrim’s self-administration on 5 February 2008
and formally appointed Mr Syska as administrator.
4 The application was based on s 67, Arbitration Act 1996 (UK). The section reads:
“(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon notice to the other parties and to the
tribunal) apply to the court—
(a) challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive jurisdiction; or
(b) for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect,
in whole or in part, because the tribunal did not have substantive jurisdiction.”
It was argued that there was failure of substantive jurisdiction because the tribunal lacked
the substantive competence to hear the claim following Elektrim’s bankruptcy under
Polish law.
5 Art. 142, Polish Bankruptcy Law Act.
6 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1346/2000 of 29th May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings
which came into force on 31 May 2002.
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on art 15, EIR. Article 15 provides that “the effects of insolvency proceedings
on a lawsuit pending . . .shall be governed solely by the law of the Member
State in which that lawsuit is pending”. Indeed, art 4(2)(f) explicitly states that
“the effects of the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by individual
creditors, with the exception of lawsuits pending”7.The argument was thus that
since the arbitration was a ‘lawsuit pending’, reference should be had to the lex
arbitri. The lex arbitri is is English law since England is the seat of the arbi-
tration Under English law8, there is no automatic mandatory stay or vis at-
tractiva (ie forcing the dispute to be decided by the court administering the
main insolvency proceeding).
The Commercial Court, the court at first instance, declined to set aside the
arbitral award. It held that there was a conflict between the general provisions
of art 4 of the Regulation and the specific provision of art 15. In a conflict
between the general and the specific, the specific should prevail. It therefore
ruled that English law should determine the effect of the insolvency on the
arbitration and, since, there was no provision under English law annulling the
arbitration agreement, the award should be endorsed. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal9 agreed with the outcome made by the lower court but disagreed with
its reasoning. The Court of Appeal stated that it was generally accepted that
‘lawsuit pending’ (as used in art 15) included references to arbitration. There-
fore, the arbitration was properly covered by art 15 which serves as an excep-
tion to art 4. As such, the question of the effect of Elektrim’s bankruptcy on the
arbitration proceedings should be resolved using English law. The arbitral
award was therefore confirmed.
The object of this article is not merely to discuss the approaches taken by the
two English courts but to explore in a wider context, drawing from the legal
norms in other European countries, how as amatter of principle or policy such
issues of conflict between the need to support arbitration and the imperative to
provide for a systematic way of dealing with cross border EU insolvencies
might be better understood.
II. The Competing Imperatives
An important starting point in our discussion has necessarily to be the ration-
ale between the different applicable laws available under the Regulation. Ar-
ticle 4(2) makes it plain that as a general rule, the law of the state in which
insolvency proceedings are opened should govern “the opening of those pro-
7 Emphasis added.
8 Schedule B1, para 43(6) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
9 Permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused on 6 November 2009 (see http://
www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/pta-0910-1002.pdf).
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ceedings, their conduct and their closure”. It is quite appropriate for the law of
that state to address all matters relating to meeting the creditor’s debt and the
available assets to meet those debts. Indeed, recital 23 of the Regulation states
“unless otherwise stated, the law of the Member State of the opening of the proceedings should be
applicable (lex concursus). This rule on conflict of laws should be valid both for the main proceed-
ings and for local proceedings; the lex concursus determines all the effects of the insolvency
proceedings, both procedural and substantive, on the persons and legal relations concerned. . ..”
By a similar token, it is not surprising to see why pending lawsuits would be
excluded from the lex concursus. A lawsuit (including a reference to arbitra-
tion) is vital to determine the existence or validity of any claims involving the
creditors and debtors. Once these claims have been declared upon, they could
be taken into account in the relevant insolvency proceedings. Recital 24 of the
Regulation states that automatic recognition of insolvency proceedings to
which the law of the opening state normally applies may interfere with the
rules under which the transactions are carried out in other Member States. In
order to protect legitimate expectations and the certainty of transactions in
Member States other than that in which the proceedings are opened, the same
recital goes on to provide that a number of exceptions to the general rule
should be provided for. It is not a stretch beyond the reasonable to construe
the reference in this recital to “protect legitimate expectations and certainty of
transactions” as including the commercial expectation that lawsuits or arbitral
proceedings already commenced in a Member State other than that where the
insolvency proceedings are opened to be fully completed and resolved by the
former Member State10.
On this reading, it might be natural to assert, contrary to the finding of the
English Commercial Court, that there is effectively no direct conflict between
art 4 and art 15. Indeed, it may be said that as matter of general precept, the link
between the two articles support the policy of the Regulation to reduce con-
flict of laws. However and regardless, all this still does not entirely help
matters – so what if there is no direct conflict? The two articles would need
to be interpreted in a complementary manner.
As a matter of interpretation, it is thus useful for us to remind ourselves of the
recommended approach. The Regulation is intended to lay down common
rules to be uniformly applied throughout all Member States11. It is intended to
form a single legal order. It therefore exists in texts in each of the languages of
the Union, all of which are equally authentic. As such, its terms and concepts
10 Of course different considerations would apply where the lawsuit or arbitration has not
yet been commenced but merely contemplated. In such a case, it should be the lex
concursus that should determine whether the lawsuit or arbitration should actually
commence or proceed.
11 With Denmark having opted out.
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should not be interpreted by reference to any particular national legal system –
whether it is of a state which is involved in the proceedings in question12. The
concepts contained in the Regulation should be treated as being autonomous.
In the words of the Virgos-Schmit Report, “an autonomous interpretation
implies that the meaning of its concepts should be determined by reference
to the objectives and system of the Convention, taking into account the spe-
cific function of those concepts within this system and the general principles
which can be inferred from all the national laws of the Contracting States”13.
There is also another imperative. The Regulation as a unifying legislation
should be interpreted with a view of promoting uniformity throughout the
Union14 and meeting its declared objectives.
On that basis it is vital when construing words like “lawsuit pending” to refer
to the languages of the text and seek out an autonomous definition. Article 15
states that the effects of insolvency proceedings on a lawsuit pending concern-
ing an asset or right of which the debtor has been divested shall be governed
solely by the law of the Member State where that lawsuit is pending. In the
UK, a lawsuit is frequently thought to refer to judicial proceedings. The
Collins Dictionary defines it as “a proceeding in a court of law brought by
one party against another, especially a civil action”. Similarly, the American
Heritage Dictionary defines it as an action or a suit brought before a court, as
to recover a right or redress a grievance”. Whilst a number of the other official
texts also use the term “lawsuit”, the following languages are more capacious.
The translation of art 15 from the Hungarian version reads “the effects of
insolvency proceedings on ongoing proceedings concerning an asset
etc. . .”15. The Bulgarian version of art 15 translates into “the consequences
of insolvency proceedings on pending legal disputes. . .”16 whilst the French
version “Les effets de la procedure d’insolvabilite sur les poursuites individu-
elles, a l’exception desinstances en cours” could well designate either court or
arbitral proceedings. The Portuguese17 version of art 4(2)(f) refers to the ex-
12 See the Virgos-Schmit Report para 43. The EU had negotiated for a Convention on
bankruptcy but the convention lapsed when the UK failed to sign it. The Virgos-Schmit
report was to have been the Official Report of that Convention. Parts of the report had
subsequently found their way into the Recitals of the Regulation. As such, although it is
not prescribed as an interpretative guide, it is pragmatic to use it as one.
13 ibid.
14 Uniformity is essential in a statute applicable to throughout the Union because the
citizens of the Union who are guaranteed parity and equality of treatment should
benefit from the same rights and processes.
15 The heading in art 15 reads: “A fizetésképtelenségi eljárások hatása a folyamatban lévo˝
peres eljárásokra”.
16 The heading reads: “ПocлeДици oт прoизвoдcтвoтo пo нecъcтoЯтeлнocт пo oтнo-
шeниe на виcЯщи правни cпoрoве”.
17 The words are : “Os efeitos do processo de insolvência nas acções individuais, com
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ception of “pending proceedings” which could also be read as including arbi-
tral proceedings. The same seems to be true of the German18, Spanish19 and
Italian20 versions. On the other hand, the Finnish21 and Latvian22 translations
are more narrow – referring specifically to “proceedings in court”23.
It might be useful to allude to an important text by Profs. Virgo and Garci-
martin24 where with reference to art 4(2)(f), the authors commented that
”. . . Insolvency proceedings are designed to provide a collective forum, a solution that avoids
competition by creditors for the debtor’s assets and allows for the orderly examination of the
debtor’s and the creditor’s rights. Article 4.2.f protects this function. The lex fori concursus will
therefore decide to which extent individual actions by creditors to enforce their claims through
collection efforts, adjudication, execution or otherwise are to be suspended or enjoined. The term
“proceedings” is broad enough to encompass all kinds of procedures brought about by individual
creditors, including arbitration proceedings and enforcement measures initiated by creditors out-
side the court system, where allowed.”25
Although the text was originally in Spanish, there is little doubt that the
authors did intend to include arbitration proceedings within “lawsuit pend-
ing”. At one level, it should be said that there are no good grounds for giving
“lawsuit pending” a narrow construction. Arbitration has been increasingly
recognised in the EU as a central plank to the need to provide access to justice
for the EU citizen. Excluding arbitration proceedings from the scope of
art 4(2)(f) and consequently, art 15, would merely relegate the arbitral process
to a lower status than judicial process for no reason serving the wider public
policy and interest. Indeed, as the English High Court judge said,
“Parties to a commercial arbitration have a legitimate expectation that the reference will not grind
to a halt upon an insolvency . . . if the law of the place where the arbitration is pending would not
have that effect.”26
excepção dos processos pendentes”; its art 15 is less clear: “efeitos do processo de
insolvência em relação a acções pendentes”.
18 The German text states: “Wirkungen des Insolvenzverfahrens auf anhängige Re-
chtsstreitigkeiten”.
19 The Spanish text uses these words: “Efectos del procedimiento de insolvencia sobre
procedimientos en curso”.
20 The Italian version uses these words: “Effetti della procedura di insolvenza sui proce-
dimenti pendent”.
21 The Finnish text refers to “Maksukyvyttömyysmenettelyn vaikutukset vireillä oleviin
oikeudenkäynteihin”.
22 Like the Finnish text, it reads quite specifically, “Maksa¯tnespe¯jas procedu¯ru sekas at-
tiecı¯ba¯ uz tiesvedı¯ba¯ esosˇa¯m lieta¯m”.
23 Emphasis added.
24 The European Insolvency Regulation: Law and Practice, Kluwer (2004).
25 Para 121(g); emphasis added.
26 Para 97 of the judgment.
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On the other hand, despite the laudable teleology, there is some anomaly in this
approach where the lex concursus provides that arbitration cannot commence
once insolvency proceedings have started (as was the case in Poland for Syska).
Theargumentgoes something like this – the arbitrationagreementwill continue
to exist if arbitral proceedingshavebeencommencedprior to theCOMI (centre
ofmain interact) seising jurisdiction but it stops having any effect if the arbitral
proceedings have not yet been started at the time insolvency proceedings com-
mence27. The problem is then exacerbated by the question as towhether the lex
arbitri (in Elektrim’s case, English law) would treat the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement which by then for all intents and purposes has become
invalid under the lex concursus. The lex arbitri would normally recognise the
role of the lex concursus but how should it respond in these circumstances?
Perhaps the solution would be to turn a blind eye to the perceived conflict
between art 15 and art 4(2)(e). If these provisions are deemed to be two entirely
distinct, independent and autonomous rules, the question of reconciling the
two does not need arise. The issue would then merely whether the arbitration
constitutes a lawsuit pending – which was what the Court of Appeal did and
once it is concluded that it is, then the lex arbitri will determine what would
happen to the arbitration but also andmore importantly, the issue of validity of
the arbitration agreement. This is by and large a good solution because it is
simple and avoids the problem of trying to reconcile art 4(2)(e) and art 15. It
also seems to support the principle of party autonomywhich is largely deemed
essential in arbitration.
However, this masks the problem that there is in effect a conflict – giving
eminence to the lex arbitri by virtue of art 15 means to compel the lex con-
cursus to accommodate an arbitration agreement which in normal circumstan-
ces it would not have recognised.
More crucially, art 15 does not provide an answer to the question of what is the
effect of insolvency on the arbitration agreement. So in the Syska’s scenario
this might well occur. The lex arbitri is to apply, as directed by art 15. In order
to decide the effect of the insolvency on the arbitration, the lex arbitri (English
law) then will turn to art 4(2)(e) which forms part of its laws. Article 4(2)(e)
will then require the application of Polish law which as we know will invalid-
ate the arbitration agreement. Hence, a renvoi could effectively arise. Oneway
round this is to treat art 15 as implicitly preventing renvoi although this is not
stated in the text of the regulation. In other words, once English law is man-
dated under art 15, English law will apply its own substantive laws to deter-
27 See for example Millett, Cross-border insolvency: the effect of insolvency proceedings
on pending arbitrations (2009) 8 Journal of International Banking and Financial Law
456 – Mr Millett was one of the barristers acting for the claimants in Syska v Vivendi.
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mine what happens to the pending lawsuit without reference to its conflict of
laws rules, and thus will not rely on art 4.2(e) to apply Polish law28.
These are difficult problems with the two provisions where arbitral proceed-
ings are involved. Further debate is surely needed. The arguments going either
way are persuasive – perhaps one way forward would be for Member States to
consider removing their objections to recognising the validity of arbitral
agreements once insolvency proceedings have commenced.
In this connection, it might be useful to draw some guidance from the German
experience. In Germany, the position is that the opening of the insolvency
proceedings will not affect the arbitrability of existing disputes or, indeed, the
validity of the arbitration agreement. In a recent Federal Court case involving
two ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) awards29, some very impor-
tant and interesting observations were made by the court. The facts were fairly
straightforward. Arbitration proceedings were instituted on the ground that
some provisions of the contract for the construction and delivery of parts of a
compost plant had been breached. A fewmonths later, insolvency proceedings
were instituted with reference to both defendants. The arbitral panel was
informed and in the meantime, the claimant lodged a number of claims with
the insolvency administrators. These claims were not entirely identical to the
ones raised in the arbitration. The Dutch arbitrator continued with the arbi-
tration proceedings. The administrators objected and refused to participate30
in the insolvency. The arbitrator then made two awards which the claimant
applied to theHigher Regional Court in Cologne for recognition and enforce-
ment31. The Cologne court held that whilst arbitration proceedings may con-
tinue during insolvency proceedings, the award nevertheless was contrary to
public policy for failure to conform to the basic principles of German insol-
vency law32; the policy rationale being the need to protect the principle of
equal treatment of all creditors of the same class. The claimant thus appealed to
the Federal Court of Justice. The appellate court held that whilst it is right that
s 240 Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung-ZPO)33 does require a
28 ibid.
29 OLG Köln, SchiedsVZ 2008, 152; as discussed in Int. A.L.R. 2004, 7(4), N52-53; on
appeal to the Bundesgerichtshof, in its decision of 29. 1. 2009 (III ZB 88/07; BGHZ 179,
304).
30 By refusing to pay towards the costs.
31 Supra n 29.
32 s.87 Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung – InsO) provides:
“Claims held by the Creditors of the Insolvency Proceedings
The creditors of the insolvency proceedings shall only be permitted to enforce their
claims under the provisions governing the insolvency proceedings.”
33 In 1998, the provisions of the ZPO relating to arbitration were amended and adapted to
international standards. Until then, under s.1025(1) ZPO, both pecuniary claims and
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stay of court proceedings after the opening of insolvency proceedings, it did
not apply to arbitration proceedings. On that basis it could not be said that the
continuation of arbitration proceedings when insolvency proceedings had
commenced was a prima facie violation of public policy.
On further appeal to the Bundesgerichtshof, the superior court reiterated that
under German law, the insolvency of a party to an arbitration agreement does
not nullify the arbitration agreement. As such, the administrator of the insol-
vent continues to be bound by the arbitration agreement as the insolvent’s legal
successor. Similarly, when a party upon becoming insolvent and loses his
capacity as a party to the agreement, the arbitration cannot proceed with
him. Public policy requires that the arbitration could only be continued with
the administrator of his estate. If the arbitration proceeded with no substitu-
tion of the insolvent as a party, the arbitration runs foul of German public
policy.
Although this example is essentially about domestic arbitration and domestic
insolvency proceedings, a few useful lessons might be learnt. First, the em-
phasis on the sanctity of the insolvency proceedings is pivoted on the per-
ceived public interest to protect the principle of equality of treatment for all
creditors. However, the German courts did not think there was an assault on
the public interest where the arbitration had already been commenced; the
assault was only where the party had been allowed to continue to arbitrate as a
party when he should have been replaced by the administrator. It should be
said though that given that this was within a domestic context, it might be
suggested that the court was fairly secure in thinking that as the arbitral
process would nevertheless be open to judicial scrutiny at some stage, control
was never really relinquished. Naturally the same premise might not be so
convincing where a cross border element is involved. That said, in an EU
context where there should be a presumption of a level playing field and a
high degree of mutual judicial and administrative cooperation34, the cross
border argument might be less potent.
On the substance of the public policy and interest factor, other than the mere
restatement of the need to protect assets and in turn the pari passu principle,
the public interest defence is not, perhaps quite rightly, not fully fleshed out.
That leaves a degree of discretion to the controlling court. It should never-
non-pecuniary claims were only arbitrable if the dispute was open to settlement by the
parties. The amendment was to extend the scope of arbitrability of disputes by limiting
this test to non-pecuniary claims, whereas pecuniary claims are now generally arbitra-
ble. See editor’s note in Int. A.L.R. 2004, 7(4), N52-53.
34 For a list of the current and forthcoming initiatives under the auspices of the EU on
judicial and administrative cooperation, please see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/
civil/policies_civil_intro_en.htm.
ECFR 4/2011Jason Chuah432
theless be said that the scope of the pari passu principle has been under much
scrutiny, especially within the common law system35. The argument is essen-
tially that the principle has been given more weight and emphasis than need
be36 – it does not adequately guarantee fair treatment of creditors and fails to
accommodate the wider societal interest.
It is submitted that these are useful reference points in the cross border context
– especially as regards the EU Insolvency Regulation. Given the increasing
recognition that an arbitration agreement is enforceable against the liquidator
or administrator37, it might be useful to consider whether there should better
consistency where cross border situations and the EU Insolvency Regulation
come into play.
III. Framing the question in terms of corporate capacity
It might be of interest to note that the dispute between Vivendi and Syska was
also repeated in Switzerland. The Swiss case38 should be interesting because
the EU Regulation did not apply. Vivendi argued there that it was for the lex
arbitri to decide whether the tribunal had jurisdiction over Elektrim despite its
bankruptcy. The Swiss Supreme Court referred to art 154 and art 155(c) of the
Swiss Private International Lawwhich provided in effect that corporations are
governed by the law of the state under which they are established. That law
shall also, under the law, “govern in particular . . . (c) the legal capacity and the
capacity to act”. The Swiss SupremeCourt thus agreed with the lower tribunal
in Geneva that the effect of art 142 of the Polish Bankruptcy and Reorganisa-
tion Law was that Elektrim ceased, upon the commencement of insolvency
35 See Mokal, Priority as Pathology: The Pari Passu Myth (2001) Vol. 60 Cambridge LJ
581.
36 ibid.
37 See the discussions in French legal commentaries, for example, Société Soules c/Société
Henry – Maitre Texier, Syndic, Cass. com. 4 février 1986, Rev. Arb. (1988), p. 718;
Société Technique d’avant-garde (T.A.G.) c/Société Entertainment Media France Corp.
(B.M.P.C.) et autres, Cass. com., 12 février 1985, Rev. Arb. (1985), p. 275, Note P. Ancel.
See also, P. Ancel, ‘Arbitrage et procédures collectives après la loi du 25 janvier 1985’,
Rev. Arb. (1987), pp. 127–132, at p. 128. For Dutch sources, see M. Ynzonides, ‘De
invloed van faillietverklaring op arbitrage’, Weekblad voor privaatrecht, notariaat and
registratie (WPNR), No. 6008, (1991), pp. 389–396; P. Sanders, ‘Arbitrage en faillisse-
ment’, Tijdschrift voor arbitrage (TvA) (1988) 6, pp. 167–170; W. van Rossem/
R.P. Cleveringa,Verklaring van het NederlandsWetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvorder-
ing, 4th edn. (Zwolle: W.E.J. TjeenkWillink, 1972), Art. 620, No. 4, n. 22. p. 1327. More
generally, Lazic, Arbitration and Insolvency Proceedings”, (1999) Vol. 3.3 Electronic
Journal of Comparative Law.
38 Decision 4A_428/2008 (31 March 2009) (Swiss Supreme Court) accessible at http://
www.bger.ch.
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proceedings, to have the capacity to participate in the arbitration. All pending
arbitration which the corporation had agreed tomust be discontinued.What is
interesting about this approach is that without the fetters of the EU Regula-
tion, the question could be framed in the terms of corporate capacity. On that
premise the Swiss decision is quite opposed to the English position.
The Swiss approach clearly places much more importance on the law of the
place of incorporation or establishment. In some ways, this solution should
not be seen as purely mechanistic but as preserving a high degree of neutrality
because the court would not engage in asking the teleology of cross border
insolvency regimes which those countries applying the EU Regulation must
necessarily ask. In the English case of Syska v Vivendi, for example, both the
High Court and the Court of Appeal were at pains to stress that they were
interpreting the Regulation using the teleological method. On the contrary,
the Swiss Supreme Court merely had to ask where Elektrim was incorporated
and turned then to Polish law for a resolution. It should not however be
thought the Swiss court treated the lex concursus as having trumped over the
lex arbitri39. It was merely interested in giving legal sovereignty to the country
of incorporation. Of course, the Swiss tribunal, unlike the English court, did
not have the problem of trying to reconcile arts 4(2) and 15 of the EIR since the
EIR does not form part of Swiss law.
It is not the object of this article to critique the correctness of the Swiss
decision in the light of Swiss law or to comment on the correctness of the
arbitral tribunal’s decision/s40; our object is to consider the implications of an
approach based on capacity in resolving the issue of the arbitration agree-
ment’s validity.
The reference to the place of incorporation on the question of capacity how-
ever raises the criticism as to why the law of the place of incorporation should
necessarily prevail. In commercial relationships, modern corporate thinking
is, for the most part, that a person dealing with the company is entitled to
assume that it had the legal capacity to contract. In the UK, for example, the
doctrine of corporate ultra vires has been largely abolished41with the emphasis
39 Markat (supra fn 2) points out, “In light of the approach taken, the solution is also not
contradictory to the “English Case”. Both cases were simply decided on different legal
bases – the “English Case” focusing on the validity of the arbitration agreement and the
“Swiss Case” on the procedural capacity of a party to the proceedings. It is therefore not
surprising that the outcome differs accordingly.” That said, it might be said that in fact
both cases focussed on the validity issue, except that with the English case the solution
was deemed to be found in a choice between the lex concursus or the lex arbitriwhilst the
Swiss case had the “easier” task of simply inquiring into the law of the place of incor-
poration.
40 For such a criticism, see Markat (supra n2).
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firmly placed on the contract’s applicable law. The law of the place of incor-
poration should govern matters of internal capacity (such as the relationship
between the company and its shareholders) but inmatters of external relations,
a more nuanced approach is called for42.
The place of incorporation test presupposes that one is able to identify the
contracting party with certainty. That may not always be a straightforward
question in today’s world of large multinational corporate groups. Addition-
ally, there may not be a sufficient link between the place of incorporation and
the transaction or agreement or factual matrix in question.Would it be right to
use the law of the place of incorporation as a reference point under these
circumstances?
As far as the Single Market is concerned, giving the law of the place of incor-
poration such prominence might result in a derogation of the principles of free
movement. It is not untenable to suggest that this may encourage some degree
of shopping for a most condign place of incorporation and creates uncertainty
and loss of legitimate expectation of cross border business dealings within the
Single Market.
Lastly even if the law of place of incorporation is relevant, should it not be
relevant only at the time the parties were making the arbitration agreement
rather than the time when the arbitration is intended to occur? An analogy
might be made with the position under the New York Convention43. Article
V(1)(a) of the Convention which provides for “incapacity” as a vitiating factor
preventing the enforcement of a foreign award links incapacity to the making
of the agreement by an express reference to art II (which deals with themaking
of the arbitration agreement)44.
41 Section 39 of theUKCompanies Act 2006 provides that “the validity of an act done by a
company shall not be called into question on the ground of lack of capacity by reason of
anything in the company’s constitution.”
42 This point is especially forcefully argued by Profs. Willis Reese and Edmund Kaufman
in their article “The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact
of Full Faith and Credit” (1958) 58 Colum LR 1118. Prof Reese was responsible for
writing the US Second Restatement on Conflict of Laws and was a key member of the
US delegation to the Hague Conference on Private International Law.
43 The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards 1958. (33 UNTS 3 (1958)).
44 Article V(1)(a) provides, “Recognition and enforcement of the awardmay be refused, at
the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a)
The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law applicable to
them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which
the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the
country where the award was made.” As for the text of art II, please see n. 57. See in
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IV. The common law angle
It might be useful to evaluate how common law jurisdictions45 might ap-
proach the question of choice between the lex arbitri and the lex concursus
where pending arbitral process impinge on the national bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction to deal with cross border insolvencies. A sampling of US46, Cana-
dian47, Australian48 and Hong Kong49 law and practice suggests a prepared-
ness of the bankruptcy courts to allow pending arbitrations to resolve them-
selves before the insolvency process will continue. In that regard, it would
also seem to follow that the validity of the arbitration agreement (and its
proceedings) would thus be determined by the lex arbitri instead of the lex
concursus.
Where the insolvency proceedings have commenced, the position is fairly
similar to that amongst EUMember States. An straightforward example might
be the new Spanish Insolvency Law. The new Insolvency Act provides that
arbitration agreements to which the debtor is a party to will have no legal
particular an importantUS decision where this interpretation of art Vwas discussed and
endorsed – Concoran v AIG Multi-Line Syndicate Inc 143 Misc. 2d 62, 539 N.Y.S. 2d
630, 636 (S Ct N.Y.Co 1989), rev’d 562 N.Y.S. 2d 933 (1990). Also, Westbrook, The
Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bankruptcy (1983) 67 Minn. L. Rev
595, 614–616. Article V was recently made the subject matter of an important English
decision, Dallah Estate and Tourism Holding Company v The Ministry of Religious
Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46. In that case, the Supreme Court held
controversially that the court where enforcement was sought could rule on the com-
petency of the arbitration contrary to the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine. There, the
Government of Pakistan had set up a trust which had entered into an arbitration agree-
ment with Dallah. The ICC tribunal in Paris, France, decided that it had competency
because theGovernment of Pakistanwas the successor of the trust when the trust ceased
operating. The Supreme Court disagreed with that finding. What is noteworthy in that
case was not the disagreement over the question of capacity but the fact that the Su-
preme Court had interfered with the tribunal’s own finding on competency or juris-
diction.
45 England and Wales, of course, may not apply pure common law principles where the
EIR applies.
46 See Sentner, Arbitration/Bankruptcy/Appeal: Where Rules collide (2006) 7 Business
Law International 12.
47 See Crozier, Status of International Arbitration Awards under Canadian Insolvency
Law (1991) 18 Canadian Business Law Journal 18.
48 See Jones, Recent Developments in International Commercial Arbitration (2008) 11
International Trade and Business Law Rev 83.
49 See Soo, External Impact on Arbitration: Company Insolvency on International Arbi-
tration http://www.hkiarb.org.hk/PDF/e_news_20060821_doc9.pdf; also Re Sinom
(Hong Kong) Limited (HCMP73/2009, 5 August 2009); Re Jade Union Investment
Limited HCCW 400/2003, 5 March 2004; Re B+B Construction Company Limited
(In Liquidation) HCCW114/2001.
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effect whilst insolvency proceedings carry on50. The courts set up to deal with
insolvency issues will have exclusive jurisdiction over all questions including
those which would ordinarily be governed by the arbitral agreement. The law
howevermakes an allowance where there is an international conventionwhich
might provide otherwise. In such a case, the lex concursus may allow the
arbitration in a foreign country to proceed but even so, Spanish law will
prevent any enforcement of an award made in these circumstances in its ter-
ritory51. As one commentator says, “The new rules contained in the [Insol-
vency Act] shows the mistrust of the Spanish legislature towards arbitration
agreements and proceedings, which are seen as a potential vehicle to defraud
creditors and escape from the strict rules of insolvency proceedings”52.
In common law jurisdictions too, there seems to be a rise in the use of the
public interest exception to restrain arbitrationswhere insolvency proceedings
have been commenced in parallel.
In a recent decision from Singapore53, for example, it was held by the Singa-
porean High Court that an application to stay insolvency proceedings in
favour of arbitration could not be granted because the issue in question was
about whether certain transactions were unfair preferences or transactions
made at undervalue was one best left to the courts of law and not private
arbitrations. The Singaporean jurisdiction is often perceived as pro-arbitration
but in this regard, the SingaporeHighCourt was swift to stress the importance
of the public interest involved. The question which would have been referred
to arbitration was specifically one about the insolvent’s assets and the court
was thus disinclined to allowing it to go to arbitration. What is especially
noteworthy in this case (the first of its kind in Singapore) is that the question
was framed in terms of whether the matter was arbitrable. As far as the court
was concerned, it was best placed to protect the creditor interest generally. It
thus decided that it was contrary to public policy or the public interest54 to
allow the matter to be arbitrated once insolvency proceedings have com-
menced. It did not think it fit to allow the arbitral tribunal to decide on this
issue of competency. This approach mirrors that in an Australian case, New
50 Art. 52(1).
51 Lopez Ortiz, “Spain: the new Spanish Insolvency Act and Arbitration” (2005) Interna-
tional Arbitration Law Review N22.
52 ibid.
53 Petroprod Ltd (in official liquidation in the Cayman Islands and in compulsory liqui-
dation in Singapore) v Larsen Oil and Gas Pte Ltd [2010] SGHC 186.
54 The Singapore International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A) 2002 provides, in s 11(1), that
that any dispute which the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration under an arbi-
tration agreement may be determined by arbitration, unless it is contrary to public
policy to do so.
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Cap Reinsurance Corporation Limited v A E Grant & Ors, Lloyd’s Syndicate
No. 99155.
In the common law system, generally, there is much responsibility vested in
the judicial role to ensure the balance when there is a collision of rules in this
context. Leave or permission from the courts will usually be required before
an action may be taken in arbitration against a person who is insolvent.
Although the common lawworld is usually assumed to be arbitration friendly,
the public interest argument seems to be gaining increasing traction as an
exception to arbitrability of disputes involving domestic and foreign insol-
vents. How and to what extent this would spread to the Elektrim-type sit-
uation (where arbitration had already been commenced) in the common law
world makes for an intriguing question, noting of course that English position
would only be guided by pure common law principles where the EIR does not
apply (namely in a non-EU context).
V. The New York Convention
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards56 is the primary instrument relied on bymodern states for the
enforcement and recognition of international arbitration awards and agree-
ments. The question as to the perceived conflict between the lex concursus and
the lex arbitri might also be examined from the perspective of the convention
rules. We know that the Convention lays down, in art II57, certain exceptions
when a court of law may refuse to recognise or enforce an arbitral agreement
or award. There are two provisions in art II which pertain to an insolvency
context. First, art II(1) provides that an arbitration agreement shall be recog-
nised if it concerns “subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration”.
Second, art II(3) provides that an arbitration agreement is enforceable unless
the court finds the agreement itself “null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed”. The Convention however leaves it to the courts seized to
55 [2009] NSWSC 62.
56 Supra n 43.
57 Art II reads:
“(1) Each Contracting State shall recognise an agreement in writing under which the
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or
which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether con-
tractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
(2) . . .
(3) The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of
which the parties havemade an agreement within the meaning of this Article shall, at the
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.”
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decide what law governs the determination of these issues, including the reli-
ance on applicable conflict rules.
It could thus be argued that the declaration of insolvency would exclude the
subject matter of the liquidator’s dispute from settlement by arbitration and
the placing of the dispute into the hands of the insolvency tribunal exclusively.
This is fairly uncontroversial as we have seen above. However the Convention
is clearly less explicit when it comes to the situation where there is an arbi-
tration pending and the party then becomes insolvent as is the case inElektrim.
In the context of states which have made a “commercial dispute” reservation
to the New York Convention, the implications when a party to the arbitration
becomes insolvency can be especially interesting. Article I of the New York
Convention allows contracting states to enter a reservation or limitation to the
applicability of the Convention. Article I(3) states that,
“when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying extension under article X
hereof, any State may. . . declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
national law of the State making such declaration.”
EUMember States which have made such a reservation are Poland, Romania,
Hungary, Greece, Denmark, and Cyprus. China and USA are two important
trading nations which have also made such a reservation. The question is
namely this – when a company is liquidated does the relationship between
the company and its counterparty in the arbitration change from commercial
to a regulatory one? The issue was considered in a US case Corcoran v Ardra
Insurance Co58. The New York Appellate Division held that the dispute be-
tween the insurer (established in New York) and reinsurer (established in
Bermuda)59 was no longer of a commercial nature under art I(3) of the Con-
vention once the insurer was liquidated60. Before the court of appeals though,
58 77 N.Y.2d 225, 566 N.Y.S. 2d 575 (1990), cert denied 111 S Ct 2260 (1991); commented
on in Diaconis, Corcoran v Ardra: The Impact of Insolvency on International Reinsur-
ance Arbitration (1992–1993) 28 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 109.
59 It might also be noted that both companies were owned by members of the DiLoretto
family.
60 In the US, a court-appointed receiver (the Superintendent of Insurance) is authorised to
either rehabilitate or liquidate a domestic insurer that meets the definition of “insol-
vency” as defined by Insurance Law § 1309.
Insurance Law §§ 7402(a), 7404: An order of rehabilitation directs the Superintendent to
take possession of the property of such insurer and to conduct the business thereof, and
to take such steps toward the removal of the causes and conditions which have made
such proceeding necessary as the court shall direct.
Insurance Law § 7403(a): Should the Superintendent determine that attempts to reha-
bilitate a distressed insurer would be “futile,” he may apply to Supreme Court for an
order of liquidation.
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it was held that the nature of the relationship between the two entities should
be determined at the inception of the agreement and not at the time enforce-
ment of rights and obligations are being sought. Thus, the dispute was a
commercial dispute because there was a commercial relationship which gave
rise to the dispute.
However, the subject matter was not one which was capable of settlement by
arbitration when the nature of the commercial relationship changed. Judge
Simons61 said:
As a result of Nassau’s insolvency, and plaintiff’s substitution to liquidate its assets, the contractual
parties and their relationship have changed.Nassau no longer exists. Plaintiff steps into its shoes, in
the sense that he succeeds to its property, but he is a fiduciary, appointed by the court, subject to its
exclusive jurisdiction and possessing only the powers authorized by the Legislature. . . He holds
office as liquidator solely to protect the interests of policyholders, stockholders and the public and
has no authority to pursue the commercial interests which motivated the original parties to con-
clude the reinsurance agreements (. . . see, Matter of Knickerbocker Agency [Holz], 4 N.Y.2d 245,
250,(1958))62
It is submitted that the decision on art I(3) by the court of appeals is preferable
to that of the Appellate Division. It is surely correct that the nature of dispute
in question needs to be referred to the nature of the contract at the timewhen it
was made. On whether the change in legal status (following the liquidation)
incapacitating the dispute from being settled by arbitration, the reasoning
though understandable is more controversial. The issue of legal status might
remind us about the Swiss decision on Elektrim but there is one notable
distinction – in Corcoran, the court went a little further in holding that the
lack of capacity meant that the dispute was incapable of being settled by
arbitration under art II(1).
In Corcoran v Ardra, the appellate court also held that the Superintendent
(state appointed liquidator) was not empowered to arbitrate under the law of
the New York (lex concursus) – art V, it might be recalled provides that rec-
ognition and enforcement may be denied if “the subject matter of the differ-
ence is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country”.
The practical implications as consequence of the New York Convention
would be that as the party was seeking to arbitrate and then enforce the award
Insurance Law § 7403(c): Such order directs the Superintendent to take possession of the
property of such insurer, liquidate its business, deal with such property and business of
such insurer, and give notice to all creditors to present their claims.
Insurance Law § 7405(a): An order of liquidation terminates the distressed insurer’s
existence, and the Superintendent for all practical purposes takes the place of the in-
solvent insurer.
61 Judge Simons’ judgment was approved by all seven justices who heard the appeal.
62 See section III of the report.
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in New York, the whole arbitration would have been futile because the award
would have been unenforceable in New York.
Although the court of appeals recognised that in the interest of international
comity the foreign arbitration should be allowed to take place, the court felt
that there were many factors which rendered the circumstances more akin to
those of a domestic rather than transnational case. For one thing, the parties
were both owned by individuals who were US residents. For another, the
underlying contracts were expressed to be governed by New York law. Thus,
the case was not one involving “an international merchant [being] subjected to
unfamiliar judicial proceedings and the vagaries of foreign law requiring [the
US court] to exercise a ‘sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes’”63. Hence, although the
reinsurance agreements fell within the broad terms of the New York Con-
vention, the party concerned was excused from arbitration because the arbi-
tration clause and the dispute alleged to be subject to it were not capable of
performance and settlement under the law of New York. There was interest-
ingly no explicit discussion about whether the lex concursus or lex arbitri
would permit the arbitration to proceed in a case of insolvency.
On the argument that when the liquidator assumes control over the company
there was no longer a dispute which could be settled by arbitration, it might be
said that that ignores the fact that the liquidator’s rights are consistent with the
insolvent’s64. Even if the liquidator by stepping into the shoes of the insolvent
has become a fiduciary, it does not mean that he loses the responsibility the
company has in respect of the original contracts. It is also difficult to see how
going to arbitration would undermine the liquidator’s legal duty to protect the
interests of creditors, shareholders and the general public. Moreover, if the
insolvency does not convert the commercial relationship to a regulatory rela-
tionship, neither should the intervention of the liquidator change the arbitra-
tion provisions of that commercial relationship.
The New York court of appeals also seems to have a problem with relinquish-
ing control over the insolvency to arbitrators. Judge Simons said:
“Arbitrators are private individuals, selected by the contracting parties to resolve matters impor-
tant only to them. They have no public responsibility and they should not be in a position to decide
matters affecting insureds and third party claimants after the contracting party has failed to do so.
Resolution of such disputes is a matter solely for the Superintendent, subject to judicial oversight,
acting in the public interest.”65
63 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v Soler-Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US at 629; alsoCooper v
Ateliers De La Motobecane, S.A., 57 NY2d at 410–411.
64 Supra, n. 58 at p 131.
65 See Section III of the report; or 566 N.Y.S. 2d at 579.
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The judge was concerned over allowing arbitrators to assume a role which
might result in the loss of judicial control of the distribution of the insolvent’s
assets. Perhaps such a rationale was also behind the Swiss decision inElektrim.
Whilst it is outside the purview of this article to consider empirically how valid
this hostility towards arbitration is, it is obvious that until the courts recognise
that supporting arbitration is not the loss of judicial control66 the tension
between insolvency and arbitration will remain. This thus remains a cultural
issue for many countries.
Despite the legal controversies, it also seems clear that the court was swayed
by the fact that other than comity, there were other principles at play – “econ-
omy, convenience, and fairness”67. The decision not to allow the arbitration to
proceed was largely based on the fact that the award would subsequently be
sought to be enforced in New York.
In this light, it follows thus that situations where insolvency and arbitration
collide, there are also issues (especially for the pragmatic courts of the com-
mon law world) about recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award
which was subsequently made if the arbitration agreement is enforced despite
the party’s insolvency.
VI. A way forward as regards art 15
Returning to the EU context, what is crucial to bear in mind is that the debate
as to the scope of art 15 is not about how the substantive legal issues arising
from the insolvency proceedings should be resolved. The issue at hand is
essentially procedural. It has to do with stay of proceedings, vis attractiva
and legal standing. These are matters therefore for the lex fori to deal with.
To the contrary, the English Court of Appeal had, in essence, perceived art 15
as guiding the substantive applicable law. That seems to go against the trite rule
of private international law that it should conventionally be the lex fori to
assume jurisdiction over procedural matters.
It thus should follow that if the lex concursus permits the enforcement of
arbitration agreements on insolvency, then it is up to the procedural law of
the seat to determine the question. On the other hand, if the lex concursus
invalidates the arbitration agreement then there is no question for the proce-
dural law of the seat to attend to. The arbitral tribunal should find, in such an
66 It is after all permissible for the courts to intervene both before and after the making of
an arbitral award.
67 Kearse J, the presiding judge at the Appellate Division, citing Carnegie-Mellon Uni-
versity v. Cohill, 108 S.Ct. 614, at 621; 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
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instance, that there was no “lawsuit pending” simply because the arbitration
has ceased when the arbitration agreement was nullified by the lex concursus.
VII. Conclusion
It is all too easy to see the problem in Elektrim as a debate between those
favouring a reading of the law which supports arbitration and those who do
not. The controversy is much more nuanced than that. As we have seen in
examples and judicial practice from a number of countries, most are keen to
preserve sanctity of the arbitration agreement but at the same time not pre-
pared to allow the assets of the insolvent to be dissipated and thus breach a
cardinal rule of insolvency principle. The law, whether at common law, civil
law or EU law, however does not always provide a satisfactory answer. Both
the English and Swiss courts in Elektrim did not express a policy reason for
their application of the law (be it the Regulation or Swiss national law). In
contrast, the New York courts were careful to justify their decisions on the
basis of pragmatic justice and an invocation of the distrust of arbitral processes
to safeguard the insolvent’s estate.
The Regulation’s main aim is to ensure and promote a proper functioning of
the internal market by ensuring that cross-border insolvency proceedings
operate efficiently and effectively, and by avoiding “incentives for the parties
to transfer assets or judicial proceedings from one Member State to another,
seeking to obtain a more favourable legal position (forum shopping)”68. It
would appear that someMember States might construe this as a disinclination
for the loss of control for the courts controlling the insolvency and as arbi-
tration might be seen as derogating from this control, the English court’s
approach in Elektrim would be deemed recalcitrant.
We have seen in this article the different ways different courts have attempted
to deal with the conflict question. In the context of the Regulation, they have
tried to reconcile art 4 with art 15 by using creative legislative interpretation
techniques. They have also tried to rely on the public interest to vest control in
the insolvency court. They are also not averse to using legal capacity of the
place of incorporation to guide their decisions. There is also a hint of reliance
on so-called notions of pragmatism. The legal tapestry is not seamless and
there is no real consensus as to what should guide the shape of the principles.
The conflict will thus remain not only as a source of irritation but also, an
encumbrance for the efficient and effective operation of cross border insol-
vency proceedings.
68 See recital 4 of the Preamble.
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Perhaps one way forward is to stick as closely as possible to the widely
recognised convention in private international law where the law of the seat
should decide procedural matters arising from insolvency proceedings but
whether there is a lawsuit (or arbitration) pending is a question for the lex
concursus.
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